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Abstract
This paper presents a two-stage team rent-seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among
winning team members. When early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort, early actors can free ride on
their late-moving teammates. However, when early and late efforts are complements, all team members exert
positive effort levels. Asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers. The theory is tested
with laboratory experimental methods. Although subjects overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium in all
treatments, chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model. Early movers exerted higher effort in
the complement treatment, and second-stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response
functions. Surprisingly, in both single-shot and repeated play environments, early movers in the substitute
treatment did not free ride, choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers. [excerpt]
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Two-Stage Team Rent-Seeking: 
Experimental Analysis 
John Cadigan* 
This paper presents a two-stage team rent-seeking model with a contest prize that is not 
excludable among winning team members. When early effort is a perfect substitute for late 
effort, early actors can free ride on their late-moving teammates. However, when early and late 
efforts are complements, all team members exert positive effort levels. Asymmetries in early 
effort reduce effort choices for all late movers. The theory is tested with laboratory 
experimental methods. Although subjects overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium in all 
treatments, chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model. Early movers exerted 
higher effort in the complement treatment, and second-stage effort choices were broadly 
consistent with best response functions. Surprisingly, in both single-shot and repeated play 
environments, early movers in the substitute treatment did not free ride, choosing effort levels 
similar to those of late movers. 
JEL Classification: D72, C91 
1. Introduction 
In his seminal contribution on rent-seeking activity, Tullock (1967,1980) develops a model 
in which players choose effort levels to influence the chance they are awarded a prize. If player 
effort does not contribute to the value of the prize, rent-seeking effort results in a social welfare 
loss and can be viewed as inefficient (see also Krueger 1974; Posner 1975). Most research 
stemming from Tullock's model focuses on contests with simultaneously chosen effort levels 
and in which the contest prize is awarded to only one contestant or group (see, e.g., Hillman 
and Katz 1984; Appelbaum and Katz 1987; Snyder 1989; Nitzan 1991; Gradstein 1993; 
Fullerton and McAffee 1999). 
Many real-world contests are more complicated. For example, congressional elections in 
the United States typically involve two candidates that receive support from the two major 
political parties. Both candidates and their parties benefit from a successful bid to capture 
a seat, and there could be important connections between their effort decisions. A high-quality 
challenger exerting effort early in an election cycle might receive greater party support by 
demonstrating an ability to fare competitively in the election. Alternatively, an incumbent's 
effort might discourage a competitive challenge, freeing party resources for other purposes. In 
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86 John Cadigan 
this case, the timing of effort is important, and the contest "prize" is awarded to both the 
candidate and the candidate's party. 
As another example, many public policy issues are characterized by interest group 
lobbying from multiple groups on either side of an issue. Successful lobbying by the National 
Rifle Association, for example, benefits other groups sharing their policy preferences. In a sense, 
public policy issues motivating lobbying effort can generate public prizes that affect multiple 
constituencies in different ways. An important aspect of these environments is their team 
oriented nature, typically placing groups in one of two camps (for or against free trade, gun 
control, choice, etc.). 
This paper contributes to the literature on rent-seeking by developing and experimentally 
testing a two-stage team rent-seeking model in which the contest prize is awarded to each 
member of the winning team. In one variant of the model, aggregate team effort determines the 
probabilities associated with the contest outcome. In this case, an individual team member's 
effort serves as a perfect substitute for the effort of other team members. When effort decisions 
are sequenced, early movers have the potential to free ride on the effort choices of their later 
moving teammates. This suggests that lobbying for public policy favors could be subject to the 
same collective action problems associated with public goods provision. In a second variant of 
the model, the timing of effort matters. In particular, early effort choices shape the competitive 
structure of the contest, and in this case early movers cannot free ride on their teammates. The 
theoretical results also show that effort levels are highest in "competitive contests," with any 
asymmetries in early effort choices leading to reductions in effort by late-moving teammates. 
The theory is tested by laboratory experimental methods. A few authors have used 
experimental methods to study rent-seeking (Milner and Pratt 1989, 1991; Shogren and Baik 
1991; Davis and Reilly 1998; ?nc?ler and Croson 1998; Potters, de Vries, and Van Winden 
1998). Typically, subjects are given an endowment that can be used to invest in a chance to win 
a prize, with much of the research focusing on symmetric contests with simultaneous effort 
choices. Generally, subjects tend to overinvest relative to equilibrium predictions, although this 
tendency diminishes with experience and opportunities for repeated play within a subject 
group. The paper is also connected to a small but growing literature that examines rent-seeking 
in more complicated frameworks. Motivated by models of research and development 
expenditures, Isaac and Reynolds (1988) examine the effects of group size and the degree to 
which the contest prize is shared on individual investment decisions. They find that a shared 
prize leads to less investment at the individual level. Anderson and Stafford (2003) examine the 
effects of cost heterogeneity, group size, and an entry fee on subject participation and 
expenditures. They find that increases in group size, heterogeneity in costs, and the presence of 
an entry fee (which makes the decision-making exercise a two-stage game) decrease the number 
of subjects choosing to participate in the contest. Consistent with theory, increases in group size 
decrease individual expenditures but increase group expenditures. The use of an entry fee 
typically reduced individual expenditures, but the results with respect to individual 
expenditures under cost heterogeneity were mixed. Davis and Reilly (1998) add a "rent 
defending buyer" who has a higher value for the contest prize than a group of rent-seeking 
sellers. In some cases, the buyer bids against one seller who is the winner of a first-stage seller 
auction, which creates a two-stage game with heterogeneity in the contest prize. Generally, 
a rent-defending buyer is able to reduce aggregate rent-seeking. In a later paper, Davis and 
Reilly (2000) examine the effects of experience and adding additional rent-defending buyers, 
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finding that the presence of additional buyers limits efficiency gains. They also find that that 
experience has limited ability to reduce social costs or the variability of bids. 
Below, I examine rent-seeking in a team environment with a sequential structure and 
a contest prize that is not excludable among teammates. Consistent with existing research, in all 
treatments, the experimental results show significant overinvestment relative to the Nash 
equilibrium prediction. Regarding the qualitative predictions of the model, the results are 
mixed. Early-moving subjects chose higher effort levels when their late-moving teammate's 
effort served as a complement rather than a substitute. Effort choices of late movers were not 
best responses in a game theoretic sense but did display patterns consistent with the shape of the 
best response functions. Generally, late-moving subjects appear to have responded to the effort 
levels of their early-moving opponents in the case of substitutable effort levels and to the effort 
levels of their teammates when effort levels were complements. In contrast to the theoretical 
predictions, however, early movers did not exploit opportunities to free ride in either single 
shot or repeated play treatments, perhaps reflecting some concern for their teammate's payoff. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and 
theoretical results; section 3 details the experimental design, procedures, and results; and 
section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
Building on the basic structure in Tullock (1980), consider the following two-stage rent 
seeking game. In the first stage, two players simultaneously choose effort levels (x and y). These 
choices are revealed to two second-stage players, who then simultaneously choose effort levels 
(Zand Y). All players are assumed to be risk neutral, and have identical and constant marginal 
cost of effort (C). The contest prize (B) is awarded to each member of the winning team, with 
each team consisting of one first-stage and one second-stage player. Effort levels are restricted 
to be nonnegative.1 The probability that team X wins the contest (the "contest success 
function") is 
Px= x+x 
x + X+y+Y' 
Assuming all players act to maximize expected payoffs, the objective functions for the 
second-stage players (given the first-stage choices of x and y) are 
U?x,X,y,Y)=x+Xx++Xy+YB-CX 
and 
Uy(x,X,y,Y)=?^ X~\~ A. 
1 This restriction is consistent with many real-world policy environments. For example, if multiple groups lobby a policy 
maker, a group acting later cannot reduce lobbying effort exerted previously. 
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This leads to the following formulas for Nash equilibrium spending in the second stage: 
X*- ? -x  
~4C *' 
r = ? -v. 4C ' 
Substituting the second-stage equilibrium expenditure formulas into the objective functions of 
the stage 1 players and simplifying yields: 
Ux 
= ? ? Cx 
2 
and 
This implies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to this game has x* 
= 
y* 
= 0, and X* = Y* 
= B14C. Essentially, when the contest prize goes to both members of the winning team, 
irrespective of their relative effort levels, first-stage players are able to shift the burden of effort 
completely on their teammates. In anticipation of some of the experimental results to follow, 
note also that the nonnegativity restriction would be binding for stage 2 players if the stage 1 
players chose effort greater than Z?/4C. In this case, although stage 2 players would like to 
reduce their team's effort, the best they can do is not add to it. 
The results demonstrate that stage 1 players can free ride on the effort of their stage 2 
counterparts. In equilibrium, each player equates the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
effort. When the contest prize is not excludable between teammates, stage 2 effort levels 
influence the probability that both members of a team win the prize. Thus, an increase in stage 
2 effort reduces the marginal benefit of further effort for both team members. With constant 
marginal costs, and anticipating the effort level chosen in stage 2, the stage 1 player can free 
ride, relying on the stage 2 teammate to bring the marginal benefit of effort for both team 
members into equality with their marginal costs. In a sense, the shared nature of the prize 
induces a collective action problem similar to those associated with the provision of public 
goods. Whereas in the public goods case this is typically viewed as inefficient, free riding in the 
rent-seeking case could be beneficial because it limits wasteful spending. 
One limitation of the previous model is that the timing of effort does not matter?effort 
exerted in stage 2 is a perfect substitute for stage 1 effort in the sense that both enter the contest 
success function in exactly the same way. In many environments, however, early effort shapes 
the structural characteristics of the contest. For example, in elections for the U.S. Congress, 
early spending by a high-quality challenger can draw the attention of the major political parties, 
leading to significant party support as the election cycle closes. Alternatively, heavy spending 
by an incumbent early in an election cycle may dissuade a high-quality challenger, leading to 
a lopsided race that draws little party support. Although many contest success functions could 
capture this feature, I chose to consider a modified version of the "natural advantage" 
approach used by Snyder (1989). Snyder's paper considers the allocation of party spending 
across several congressional districts that vary according to competitiveness or natural 
advantage for one of the parties. Similar to the second-stage effort choice results below, he finds 
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that party spending levels should be high in competitive contests and low in contests in which 
additional effort has little effect on electoral probabilities. His approach, however, ignores the 
effect of candidate spending and, as such, the interdependence of candidate and party spending. 
In the present framework, stage 1 expenditures can be interpreted as candidate spending that 
influences the natural advantage in a district.2 Specifically, let the probability that team Xwins 
the contest be 
x 
our+(i-a)y' 
with 
a = 
x+y 
In this case, a determines the competitiveness of the contest, with values closer to 1 indicating 
a greater advantage for team X. If stage 1 participants choose identical effort levels, a 
= Vi and 
drops out of the expression for Px. However, when x > y, a > l/2, and the stage 2 effort of the 
player on team X is given a higher weight than the stage 2 effort of the player on team Y? 
Given the stage 1 effort levels, which determine oc, the objective functions of the stage 2 players 
can be expressed as 
Ux(X,X,y,Y)=aX+^)YB-CX 
and 
vy(^y,r)= 
Jil%YB-CY. 
The expressions for equilibrium second-stage expenditures are 
(\-a)aB x - 
C 
and 
(1-oQafl 
C 
Substituting the values for X*t and Y*? into the stage 1 objective functions yields (because X* 
= 
Y*, Px 
= 
a) 
Ux(x,y)=-?-B-Cx x+y 
and 
Uy(x9y)=^-B-Cy. x+y 
2 For more on this issue, see Cadigan (2006). 3 
Alternatively, the contest is a "weighted raffle," whereby stage 1 players determine the weights for the raffle. This is 
described in the section containing the experimental results. 
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Solving for the equilibrium first-stage effort levels yields 
4C 
and 
/ 
= - y 4C 
Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium has x* 
= X* = y* 
= Y* = B14C. In comparison with 
equilibrium effort levels for the previous contest success function, stage 2 effort is unchanged, 
but stage 1 effort is higher. In contrast to the previous results, when early effort influences the 
competitiveness of the contest, stage 1 players cannot free ride: for stage 2 spending to be 
effective, the stage 1 participant must exert effort. In equilibrium, stage 1 players match effort 
levels, oc = V2, and the stage 2 decisions remain unchanged from the previous model in which 
stage 1 players free ride. 
As in Snyder (1989), the formulas for X* and y* demonstrate that aggregate stage 2 effort 
is highest when oc 
= Vi. Values of a far from Vi (which occur off the equilibrium path) create an 
uncompetitive contest and generate reductions in effort by both advantaged and disadvantaged 
stage 2 players. When stage 1 spending generates a clear advantage, the disadvantaged stage 2 
player reduces effort because it is not as productive in affecting the contest outcome. This 
allows the advantaged player to reduce effort too, while maintaining a high expected value from 
the prize. Thus, the equilibrium results are consistent with the long-standing observation in 
U.S. politics that the major parties invest only in competitive races. Asymmetries in terms of the 
contest success function (perhaps imparted by name recognition or other perquisites of 
incumbency) might reduce aggregate rent-seeking effort by limiting the number of competitive 
contests. 
In the next section, the models are put to an experimental test. With the use of 
inexperienced subjects with a one-shot design, separate treatments were conducted to analyze 
effort choices for each contest success function. Because early movers did not free ride in the 
case of substitutable effort levels and because this result could have been influenced by the one 
shot nature of the design, I also conducted a multiperiod treatment to examine the effects of 
experience on subject decision making. 
3. Experimental Design, Procedures, and Results 
All subjects were paid volunteers recruited from the undergraduate population at 
American University. Before volunteering, subjects received an e-mail invitation to 
participate in a decision-making exercise. The invitation indicated that participants would 
be paid a $5 "show up" fee in addition to an amount that would depend on their decisions 
and the decisions of others in the experiment. All payments were made in cash, privately, at 
the end of the experimental session. On arrival at the experiment site, subjects were seated 
and given the experiment instructions (reproduced in the Appendix), which can be 
summarized as follows. 
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One-Shot Treatments: Team Rent-Seeking 1 
All participants were endowed with $6 that could be used to purchase raffle tickets for 
a monetary prize of $4. Tickets for the raffle cost $0.25. Subjects were informed they would be 
making decisions in a "team raffle" environment wherein each team consisted of two 
participants. One member of each team was referred to as a stage 1 participant and the other as 
a stage 2 participant. Each team was matched against one other team, so that each stage 1 
participant had a stage 1 opponent, a stage 2 teammate, and a stage 2 opponent. All pairing of 
participants was random and anonymous in the sense that subjects were never informed of the 
identity of their teammate or either of their opponents. 
Separate $4 prizes were awarded to each member of the winning team. Before making 
decisions, subjects were told that the probability associated with their team winning the prize 
was 
, , M. . . (Number of tickets your team buys) 
Probability your team wins the prize 
= 
(Total number of tickets bought by 
your team and your opponent's team) 
In addition, subjects were given access to payoff tables that indicated the expected prize amount 
associated with different combinations of team ticket purchases. 
Stage 1 participants made their ticket purchase decisions first, indicating the desired 
amount on a decision sheet included with the instructions. After making their choices, the stage 
1 decision sheets were collected, and the decision sheets of each stage 2 participant were 
updated to include the number of tickets purchased by their stage 1 teammate and stage 1 
opponent. Next, stage 2 participants indicated the number of tickets they wished to purchase by 
filling in the desired amount on their decision sheet, and the stage 2 decision sheets were 
collected. Each subject's decision sheet was updated to include all decisions made by a subject's 
teammate or opponents. After entering the decisions in a computer, the raffles were conducted 
using a computerized random number generator that made the draws using the probabilities 
associated with subject ticket purchases, and the results were recorded on subject decision 
sheets. Subjects were then individually called out of the room, shown their decision sheet, and 
paid in cash their experimental earnings. Earnings consisted of the $5 show up fee, the portion 
of the $6 endowment not spent on tickets, and the $4 prize if applicable. 
To put the experimental results in context, it is important to emphasize the one-shot 
nature of team rent-seeking 1 (TRS1). Subjects were inexperienced with the design, and were 
not given the opportunity to engage in repeated play. This issue is addressed in the multiperiod 
experiments described in a later section. Although the one-shot design puts the theory to 
a difficult test, it has the advantage of being short, generating statistically independent 
observations, and eliminating the potential for strategic spillovers across periods. 
Results for TRS1 
A total of 68 subjects participated in the TRS1 treatment in four sessions with about 16 
subjects per session.4 The 34 stage 1 and 34 stage 2 subjects made ticket purchase decisions for 
a total of 17 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 35 minutes, and average 
4 One session had 20 subjects. 
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Figure 1. TRS1 Ticket Purchases 
earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were 
$11.15 and $10.77, respectively. For this treatment, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has 
all stage 1 participants purchase zero tickets and all stage 2 participants purchase four tickets. 
Figure 1 displays the frequency distribution for ticket purchases for the TRS1 treatment. 
As the distribution shows, the data do not support the equilibrium point predictions. The 
average and mode of stage 1 ticket purchases (7.41 and 4, respectively) were much higher than 
the equilibrium prediction of zero. The average and mode of stage 2 purchases (8.85 and 4) 
were also high. Although positive expenditures in the first stage make it inappropriate to 
compare second-stage expenditures to the equilibrium prediction, comparison of second-stage 
ticket purchases relative to "best responses" is informative. For the parameters of this 
treatment, it is never a best response for total team ticket purchases to exceed four. Thus, if 
a stage 1 teammate buys four or more tickets, the best response (given nonnegativity of 
purchases) for their stage 2 teammate is to purchase zero tickets. Also, for the parameters of 
this treatment, the best response to a stage 1 opponent's purchase of 15 or more tickets is to 
purchase zero tickets (irrespective of stage 1 teammate's ticket purchase). Of the 27 stage 2 
subjects whose best response was 0, only four actually purchased zero tickets. The results 
clearly indicate that first- and second-stage participants overinvest relative to the Nash 
prediction. This result is consistent with the experimental results of the majority of previous 
two-person rent-seeking contests, and the literature on "bubbles" and false equilibria (see 
Sunder [1995] or Smith, Suchanek, and Williams [1988] for examples). 
Interestingly, although the average stage 2 ticket purchase was higher, differences in stage 
1 and 2 ticket purchases are not statistically significant (Wilcoxon/? 
= 0.432). This suggests that 
the stage 1 players did not exploit their strategic opportunity to free ride. Failure to do so is 
consistent with the results of several experiments on public goods (Isaac and Walker 1988) and 
could illustrate concerns for other participant's payoffs as in Levine (1998). In particular, the 
team-oriented aspect of the game might have led subjects to increase purchases so that their 
teammate had a greater chance to receive the prize. Alternatively, and as stated above, the one 
shot nature of design might not have given subjects the opportunity to learn to free ride because 
there was no repeated play. 
Furthermore, although the data indicate that stage 2 ticket purchases were not best 
responses, insight into the behavior of the stage 2 subjects can be gained by breaking ticket 
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Table 1. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable: S2 Ticket Purchase 
Variable Coefficient Estimate p-Value VIF 
SITE AM -0.08 0.739 1.39 
SIOPP -1.66 0.087 21.48 
OPPZERO -28.26 0.106 27.69 
OPPMOD -33.46 0.058 4 .91 
SIOPP X OPPMOD 1.98 0.065 13.68 
Constant 39.94 0.025 
I?_016_ 
purchases into the following categories: zero, moderate (defined as 1-14), and high (defined as 
15-24). Although the choice of 15 tickets as the cutoff point between the moderate and high 
categories is somewhat arbitrary, note that the best response for a stage 1 player to an 
opponent's purchase of 15-24 is 0. In other words, ticket purchases are classified as "high" if 
they are sufficient to keep a rational stage 2 opponent from participating in the contest.5 
Table 1 displays the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of stage 2 ticket 
purchases on stage 1 teammate purchases (SITEAM), stage 1 opponent purchases (SIOPP), 
intercept dummies for whether the stage 1 opponent purchase was 0 (OPPZERO) or in 
a moderate range (OPPMOD), and an interaction term (SIOPP X OPPMOD). Note that the 
baseline case for this specification is a subject whose stage 1 opponent made high purchases.6 
The coefficient estimates indicate that in the case of high participation, an increase in 
a stage 1 opponent's purchase led to a decrease in the stage 2 subject's purchase. Relative to the 
case of high participation, the OPPZERO coefficient indicates stage 2 purchases were lower 
when the stage 1 opponent purchased zero tickets, and the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that in cases of moderate participation (1-14 tickets purchased), 
increases in a stage 1 opponent's purchases led to increases in stage 2 ticket purchases. A 
limitation of this specification is the collinearity between the stage 1 opponent's ticket purchase 
variables (as indicated by the high variance inflation factors [VIFs] reported in Table 1). The 
severe collinearity might help explain why the coefficient estimates achieve only marginal 
statistical significance (with a range of p 
= 
0.05-0.11). 
Although the data clearly indicate overinvestment by stage 2 participants relative to their 
best responses, the regression results suggest the pattern of purchases (increasing in opponent's 
purchases over one range and decreasing over a second, higher range of opponent's purchases) 
is consistent with the shape of the theoretical best response functions. This is also reflected in 
the regression estimates of the specification presented in Table 2, which includes the squared 
value of a stage 1 opponent's purchases (SIOPP2) in addition to SI TEAM, OPPZERO, and 
SIOPP. 
Note, in particular, the positive estimated coefficient for SIOPP and negative coefficient 
on SIOPP2. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients suggests that the turning point is 
5 
Also, subjects buying more than 15 tickets spent as much or more on tickets as the value of the prize, which is irrational 
if subjects only care about their own earnings. 
6 Alternative specifications using a stage 1 teammate's purchases (zero, moderate, and high) or both stage 1 teammate's 
and stage 1 opponent's purchases generate coefficient estimates that are qualitatively similar but are not statistically 
significant. Although the coefficient estimate is not significant, the SI TEAM variable is included to avoid an omitted 
variable bias. 
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Table 2. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable: S2 Ticket Purchase 
Variable Coefficient Estimate /?-Value VIF 
SI TEAM -0.01 0.959 1.36 
OPPZERO 9.71 0.085 2.88 
SIOPP 1.54 0.085 18.46 
SIOPP2 -0.06 0.089 13.19 
Constant 1.56 0.775 
^_013_ 
around 14 tickets.7 Taken as a whole, the results offer limited support for the model 
predictions. 
One-Shot Treatments: Team Rent-Seeking 2 
The same procedures were used for the team rent-seeking 2 (TRS2) treatment, but the 
contest success function was changed to 
^ , t .,. . . (Weighted ticket purchases of your team) 
Probability your team wins the prize 
= /r_ , t-. . , . 1 ^-:-?-. 
(Total weighted ticket purchases of 
your team and your opponent's team) 
Weighted ticket purchases for a team was defined as the number of tickets purchased by the 
stage 1 participant multiplied by the stage 2 purchases of their teammate (which is functionally 
equivalent to the second contest success function used in the theory section). The value of the 
endowment, prize, cost of ticket purchases, and sequencing of decisions remained as in TRS1. 
Results for TRS2 
A total of 76 subjects participated in the TRS2 treatment in four sessions with about 20 
subjects per session.8 The 38 stage 1 and 38 stage 2 subjects made ticket purchase decisions for 
a total of 19 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 35 minutes, and average 
earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were 
$10.30 and $10.86, respectively. For this treatment, the Nash equilibrium has all participants 
purchase four tickets. Figure 2 displays the frequency distribution for ticket purchases for the 
TRS2 treatment. 
Similar to the results from TRS1, the data display significant overinvestment relative to 
the equilibrium prediction.9 For stage 1 participants, the mean and mode of ticket purchases 
were 10.79 and 8, respectively, and for stage 2 participants the mean and mode were 8.57 and 4. 
Importantly, although the point predictions from both TRS1 and TRS2 are not 
supported, average stage 1 ticket purchases did rise from 7.41 in TRS1 to 10.79 in TRS2, and 
7 Note also that no stage 1 subject purchased 13, 14, or 15 tickets. Thus, altering the specification presented in Table 1 so 
that high purchases are defined as 14-24 (which would be consistent with the turning point estimated in Table 2) does 
not influence the regression results. 
8 One session had 16 subjects. 
9 Given the parameters for this treatment, the maximum ticket purchase consistent with the best response functions in 
stage 2 is four (this occurs when both stage 1 players buy the same number of tickets). Comparing actual stage 2 
purchases with the best responses shows that 30 of the 38 stage 2 participants overinvested relative to the best response. 
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Figure 2. TRS2 Ticket Purchases 
the difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p 
= 0.019). Thus, although 
overinvestment relative to the Nash prediction was significant in both treatments, the 
qualitative theoretical prediction regarding an increase in stage 1 purchases is supported by the 
data. Intuitively, subjects exerted more effort when a teammate's effort was a complement to 
rather than a substitute for own effort. 
As with the TRS1 treatment, stage 2 ticket purchases, although not best responses, 
displayed consistent patterns. Table 3 reports the results of a regression of stage 2 ticket 
purchases on the stage 1 purchases of opponent (SIOPP) and teammate (SI TEAM), as well as 
a dummy variable for whether the stage 1 teammate's purchases were moderate (TMMOD 
= 1 
if stage 1 ticket purchase is between 1 and 14) and an interaction term (S1TM X TMMOD).10 
The coefficient estimates and significance results suggest stage 2 purchases were responsive 
to a stage 1 teammate's purchase. Holding constant the effect of a stage 1 opponent's purchase, 
an increase in stage 1 teammate's purchases led to a decrease in ticket purchases by stage 2 
participants. The coefficient on the interaction term suggests the effect of an increase in stage 1 
purchases was less severe in the moderate range, but still negative (the sum of coefficients on 
SI TEAM and the interaction term is negative). It is interesting that stage 2 purchases varied in 
a statistically significant way with the stage 1 opponent's purchase for TRS1 and the stage 1 
teammate's purchase for TRS2. It could be that when team member effort is a perfect substitute 
10 Alternative specifications, with a stage 1 opponent's purchases in categories (moderate and high) or with the use of the 
difference or ratio of stage 1 opponent and teammate purchases, generate coefficient estimates that are not statistically 
significant. Although the coefficient estimate is not significant, the SIOPP variable is included to avoid an omitted 
variable bias. 
Table 3. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable: S2 Ticket Purchase 
Variable Coefficient Estimate p-Value VIF 
SIOPP 0.06 0.680 1.04 
SI TEAM -1.24 0.020 13.52 
TMMOD -23.68 0.033 28.67 
S1TMX TMMOD 1.17 0.056 9.35 
Constant 32.36 0.005 
R2 0.169 
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Table 4. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable: S2 Ticket Purchase 
Variable Coefficient Estimate p-Value 
oc 2.967 0.812 
ADV 3.74 0.696 
ADV Xa -8.91 0.613 
Constant 8.27 0.053 
R2 0.02 
(as in TRS1), stage 2 subjects focused on canceling out the stage 1 opponent's effort. 
Alternatively, complementarities in effort decisions associated with TRS2 might have led 
subjects to respond to own teammate's purchases. 
An alternative econometric specification for stage 2 purchases can be tied directly to the 
theoretical model. The model suggests stage 2 ticket purchases should reach their peak when 
oc = Vi (with oc defined as a stage 1 teammate's purchase divided by total stage 1 purchases). If 
a stage 2 participant is at a disadvantage (oc < lA), increases in oc should lead to greater 
expenditures because they make the contest more competitive. Alternatively, for an advantaged 
stage 2 participant, increases in oc above lA make the contest less competitive and allow for 
a reduction in purchases. Table 4 presents the results of a regression of stage 2 purchases on oc, 
a dummy variable for whether the stage 2 subject was advantaged (ADV= 1 if a > Vi), and an 
interaction term (ADV X oc). 
Although the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the theory, none of the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Unfortunately, although there was significant 
variation in stage 1 ticket purchases (and as such in oc), in no contest did stage 1 participants 
purchase an identical number of tickets. This makes it difficult to assess whether first-stage 
asymmetries reduce rent-seeking effort in the second stage (as predicted by the model). Several 
other aspects of the TRS2 treatment could explain the lack of statistically significant results. In 
particular, the two-stage nature of the game, which introduces a "team"-oriented component, 
could lead stage 2 participants to respond directly to a teammate's or opponent's action rather 
than consider how these actions influence the marginal benefit and cost of ticket purchases. As 
suggested earlier, the presence of teammates might also highlight concerns for other 
participants' payoffs. Finally, the lack of repeated play or subjects who were experienced 
with the institution might have increased the variance associated with subject decision making, 
leading to coefficient estimates that are not statistically significant. 
Discussion of One-Shot Results 
Several aspects of the experimental results from the one-shot treatments support 
theoretical predictions. Stage 1 ticket purchases were higher when team member effort served 
as a complement, and the differences in stage 1 ticket purchases between TRS1 and TRS2 are 
statistically significant. Stage 2 ticket purchases, although high relative to best responses, were 
broadly consistent with the shape of the best response functions. However, the lack of free 
riding associated with stage 1 ticket purchases in TRS1 is surprising and not consistent with 
theoretical predictions. As noted earlier, this could have been related to the one-shot nature of 
TRS1 and the reliance on inexperienced subjects. To investigate whether experience with the 
institution and opportunities for repeated play would influence the free riding result, I 
conducted the following multiperiod treatment. 
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Multiperiod Treatment for TRS1 
For the multiperiod treatment, the stage game described in TRS1 (which used the contest 
success function for which team member efforts were perfect substitutes) was repeated for 
a total of eight periods. The following modifications were made to the parameter values. In 
each period, participants were endowed with $2.00 that could be used to purchase $0.10 raffle 
tickets for a monetary prize of $1.60. The periods were independent in the sense that subjects 
could not use earnings from prior rounds to purchase tickets in any subsequent round. To give 
subjects experience with a particular role, they were assigned to be a stage 1 or stage 2 
participant for the duration of the experiment. However, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously repaired at the beginning of each period to determine teammates and opponents 
and were never informed of the identity of any of their teammates or opponents. At the 
beginning of each period, stage 1 participants indicated the number of tickets they wanted to 
purchase on their decision sheets, the sheets were collected and the information was recorded 
on the stage 2 decision sheets, which were then distributed. Stage 2 participants indicated their 
ticket purchase decision, their decision sheets were collected, and the raffles were conducted 
with a computerized random number generator. Subject decision sheets were updated to 
include all information regarding teammate and opponent ticket purchases, whether their team 
won the raffle, and their earnings from the period. The stage 1 decision sheets were returned, 
and the second period began (with a random and anonymous rematching of subjects). At the 
conclusion of the eighth period, subjects were individually called out of the room and paid in 
cash their experimental earnings, which were the sum of earnings in the eight periods, plus a $5 
show-up fee. 
Results from the Multiperiod Treatment 
A total of 48 subjects participated in the TRS1 treatment, in three sessions with 16 subjects 
per session. The 24 stage 1 and 24 stage 2 subjects made ticket purchase decisions for a total of 
96 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes, and average 
earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were 
$22.50 and $23.58, respectively. In each period, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this 
treatment has all stage 1 participants purchase zero tickets and all stage 2 participants purchase 
four tickets. Figure 3 displays the frequency distribution for ticket purchases for the 
multiperiod treatment. 
Similar to previous results, the data display significant overinvestment relative to the Nash 
equilibrium prediction. Average ticket purchases for stage 1 and stage 2 participants were 6.13 
and 4.77, respectively. However, of the 192 separate decisions for stage 1 participants, 33 
(approximately 17%) were 0, and for stage 2 participants, 49 of 192 (approximately 26%) were 
best responses. Because these percentages are higher than those for the TRS1 and TRS2 
treatments, it seems that experience with the institution might have influenced play for some 
subjects. Given the experience generated by repeated play, it is useful to analyze ticket 
purchases by round. Figure 4 displays the average ticket purchase for stage 1 and stage 2 
participants by round. 
The data clearly demonstrate that stage 1 participants did not exploit their free riding 
opportunity, even with the experience generated by repeated play. Although average ticket 
purchases for stage 1 participants declined over the course of the experiment (a result consistent 
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Figure 3. Multiperiod Ticket Purchases 
with several rent-seeking experiments using simultaneous decision making over multiple 
periods), average ticket purchases for stage 1 participants were higher than average ticket 
purchases for stage 2 participants in each round. Over the final four rounds of the experiment, 
differences in stage 1 and stage 2 ticket purchases were not statistically significant (Mann 
Whitney p 
= 0.317). This reinforces the results obtained in TRS1; significant levels of free 
riding occur even when subjects are experienced with the institution. 
As was the case with TRS1, although stage 2 participants did not "best respond" in a game 
theoretic sense, their purchases were broadly consistent with the shape of best response 
functions. Table 5 displays the results of a regression of stage 2 ticket purchases in a period on 
Stage 1 Average 
Purchase 
Stage 2 Average 
Purchase 
Figure 4. Average Ticket Purchases by Round 
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Table 5. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable: S2 Ticket Purchase 
Variable Coefficient Estimate /7-Value 
OWN-1 0.22 0.010 
PROBWIN 0.663 0.109 
PROB WIN2 -0.07 0.043 
RD 0.14 0.434 
SESSIONI 1.18 0.187 
SESSION2 0.50 0.571 
Constant 1.78 0.146 
R2 0.11 
lagged ticket purchases (OWN-I),11 the probability a player would win the contest if both stage 
2 players bought zero tickets (PROBWIN 
= stage 1 teammate purchase/total purchase of stage 
1 teammate and opponent) and this value squared (PROBWIN2), and round (RD) and dummy 
variables for the experimental session the subject participated in (SESSION I, SESSION 2). 
The coefficient estimates and significance results for the PROBWIN and PROBWIN2 
terms suggest stage 2 ticket purchases and PROBWIN varied according to an inverted U shape, 
which is consistent with the intuition that subjects exert greater effort in close contests. Note 
also that the coefficient estimates on session are not significant, nor is the round coefficient.12 
Taken as a whole, the results from the multiperiod treatment reinforce those from TRS1. The 
lack of free riding associated with stage 1 ticket purchases does not appear to be an artifact of 
subject experience, and might be related to the team-oriented nature of the contests. Although 
stage 2 purchases were high relative to best responses, stage 2 subjects appear to have 
responded to the competitiveness of the contest. 
4. Conclusion 
This research extends the basic approach in Tullock (1980) by developing and 
experimentally testing a team-oriented two-stage rent-seeking model. Separate variants of the 
contest success function are used to model cases wherein team member effort serves as a perfect 
substitute or complement. The model is motivated by the observation that rent-seeking for 
public policy favors might affect multiple constituencies simultaneously, and for many issues, 
multiple groups share a preference on either side of an issue. Moreover, when various groups 
exert effort independently and at different times, the sequencing of effort choices might have 
important effects on contest outcomes. Congressional races in the United States provide one 
example in which a contest prize goes to multiple groups (a candidate and that candidate's 
party), and the sequencing of effort decisions plays an important role in shaping the contest 
outcome. 
11 
This variable helps to control for subject-specific effects. An alternative specification that uses dummy variables to 
induce subject-specific fixed effects results in parameter estimates and significance results that are consistent with 
those in Table 5. 
12 
Note, however, that the effects of learning are captured in the OWN-1 coefficient. The point estimate for this 
coefficient (0.22) suggests that, controlling for the other included variables, subjects reduced their ticket purchases 
over the course of the experiment. 
This content downloaded from 138.234.154.120 on Fri, 15 Aug 2014 12:47:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
100 John Cadigan 
The theory suggests that when effort levels serve as perfect substitutes, early actors can free 
ride on the efforts of those moving later, introducing collective action problems similar to those 
affecting public goods provision. Incentives to free ride are mitigated when early effort serves as 
a complement to later effort. This is particularly relevant when asymmetries in early effort 
create an advantage for a later moving competitor. In these cases, the model predicts 
asymmetries in early effort that generate reductions in late effort. 
Experimental methods are used to test the theory, and data from the experiments provide 
limited support for the theory. Stage 1 participants in the TRS1 treatment (in which team 
member efforts are substitutes) purchased fewer tickets than those in the TRS2 treatment 
(which models complementarities), and differences in ticket purchases are statistically 
significant. However, the free riding prediction associated with the contest success function, 
for which team member effort serves as a perfect substitute, is not supported by the data. In 
both the one-shot and multiperiod treatments, stage 1 participants purchased a significant 
number of tickets, and differences in ticket purchases between stage 1 and stage 2 participants 
were not statistically significant. The lack of free riding in late rounds of the multiperiod 
treatment suggests that experience is not an explanation for this result. Although this finding 
merits further research, the team-oriented nature of the contests may be an important element 
in subject decision making. One possibility for future research would be to investigate whether 
subjects learned to free ride in an environment in which they were matched with the same 
teammate and opponents over the course of the experiment. In addition, providing subjects 
with more experience by extending the multiperiod treatment past eight rounds might, 
eventually, lead to subject play that is consistent with theoretical predictions. Nonetheless, 
results from the current set of experiments provide interesting insights into subject play in team 
oriented contests. 
In terms of stage 2 effort choices, the data suggest subjects responded to decisions made in 
the first stage. For the TRS1 treatment, stage 2 purchases tended to be lower when a stage 1 
opponent purchased either zero tickets or a high number of tickets. In the TRS2 treatment, 
ticket purchases of stage 2 subjects declined as those of their teammate increased, and this effect 
was particularly strong when a stage 1 teammate purchased a high number of tickets. Finally, in 
the multiperiod treatment, stage 2 participants appear to have responded to the competitiveness 
of the contest. Consistent with the results from many other rent-seeking experiments, subjects 
made significant overinvestments relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction in all treatments. 
Appendix 
Instructions for TRS1 
This is an experimental study of decision making. All of the money you earn from the experiment is yours to keep. 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash, privately and confidentially, immediately after the experiment. Now that the 
experiment has begun, please do not talk. 
Introduction 
The experiment will be conducted in two stages. You are a "STAGE 1" participant. For the purposes of the 
experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one other STAGE 1 participant, who will be referred to 
as your "opponent." You will also be randomly and anonymously paired with two separate "STAGE 2" participants, 
one who is on "your team" and one who is on your "opponent's team." Importantly, you will not be told who you are 
paired with or against, and decisions will be made anonymously in the sense that no participant will be able to identify 
the decision of any other participant. 
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Conducting the Experiment 
All participants begin the experiment with $6.00, and will decide how many "raffle" tickets to purchase. Each 
ticket will cost 250. Because each participant begins with $6.00 and each ticket costs 250, each participant can purchase 
0-24 tickets. The raffle prize is $4.00, and will be awarded to each member of the winning team. This means that if your 
team wins the raffle, you will be awarded $4.00. You will indicate how many tickets you wish to purchase by writing the 
desired amount on the attached decision sheet. The raffle will be conducted as follows: 
After all "STAGE 1" participants make their ticket purchase decisions, the experimenter will collect the decision 
sheets. The decision sheets will be randomly and anonymously paired (this will determine your opponent). The 
experimenter will record the number of tickets you and your opponent chose to purchase on the decision sheets of two 
randomly selected STAGE 2 players, under the headings "tickets purchased by the STAGE 1 participant on your team" 
and "tickets purchased by the STAGE 1 participant on your opponent's team.'" 
Next the experimenter will distribute the STAGE 2 decision sheets. After viewing the number of tickets purchased 
by the STAGE 1 players on their team and on their opponent's team, the STAGE 2 participants will decide how many 
tickets to purchase. After all STAGE 2 participants have indicated the number of tickets they wish to purchase, the 
experimenter will collect the STAGE 2 decision sheets. The STAGE 1 decision sheets will then be updated to reflect the 
number of tickets purchased by team members and opponents. 
Next, the experimenter will conduct the raffle. A computer-generated random drawing will determine which team 
wins the raffle. The probability that your team wins is 
n . . ... , . (Number of tickets your team buys) 
Probability your team wins the prize = 
(Total number of tickets bought by 
your team and your opponent's team) 
BOTH members of the winning team will receive separate $4.00 prizes. If neither team buys any tickets, the prize will be 
awarded randomly, with each team having an equal chance of winning the prize. 
Expected Earnings 
Your expected earnings (in dollars) are equal to the $6.00 endowment minus the amount you spend buying tickets 
plus the probability your team wins the prize times $4.00 (the amount of the prize). 
Expected Earnings = $6.00 
? 
(amount you spend buying tickets) 4- (probability your team wins the prize x $4.00) 
Included with these instructions is a table that lists the "expected prize" for your group associated with different 
combinations of group ticket purchases. Note that this table does not list your expected earnings because it does not 
include the $6 endowment or the amount you spend on tickets. 
It is important to remember that the expected prize is based on the probability your team wins the prize. Your 
actual earnings are dependent on whether you win the prize or not. You can think of the expected prize as an average 
prize amount awarded if we repeated the raffle many times using the same probability that your team wins the prize each 
time. 
The table is provided to help you make your decision. Feel free to take time to study the sheet before you make 
a decision. 
Actual Earnings 
Your earnings will be the part of your $6.00 endowment that is not spent on tickets, plus the $4.00 prize if your 
team wins. 
PLEASE INDICATE THE NUMBER OF TICKETS YOU WISH TO PURCHASE BY FILLING IN THE 
DESIRED AMOUNT ON YOUR DECISION SHEET. 
Instructions for TRS2 
This is an experimental study of decision making. All of the money you earn from the experiment is yours to keep. 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash, privately and confidentially, immediately after the experiment. Now that the 
experiment has begun, please do not talk. 
Introduction 
The experiment will be conducted in two stages. You are a "STAGE 1" participant. For the purposes of the 
experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one other STAGE 1 participant, who will be referred to 
as your "opponent." You will also be randomly and anonymously paired with two separate "STAGE 2" participants, 
one who is on "your team" and one who is on your "opponent's team." Importantly, you will not be told who you are 
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paired with or against, and decisions will be made anonymously in the sense that no participant will be able to identify 
the decision of any other participant. 
The experiment is a "weighted" raffle for a prize of $4.00. Separate raffle prizes will be awarded to each member of 
the winning team. This means that if your team wins the raffle, you will be awarded $4.00. The probability your team 
wins the prize is: 
?,,.,. , (Weighted ticket purchases of your team) 
Probability your team wins the prize = ?=?=-?.?r-r-:-:-~-. 
(Total weighted ticket purchases of 
your team and your opponent's team) 
Weighted ticket purchases for each team will be determined according to a process described below. They are the 
product of a weight and an amount of tickets purchased. For example, if TEAM 1 has a weight of w and ticket purchases 
of x, weighted ticket purchases for TEAM 1 equal w*x . If TEAM 2 has a weight of y and ticket purchases of z, their 
weighted ticket purchases would be y*z . This means the probability TEAM 1 wins the raffle is w*x/(w*x + y*z), and the 
probability TEAM 2 wins is y*zl(w*x + y*z). 
If the weights for both teams are zero or ticket purchases for both teams are zero, the raffle prize will be awarded 
randomly, with both teams having an equal chance of winning the prize. 
Conducting the Experiment 
All participants begin the experiment with $6.00. In Stage 1 of the experiment, the weights for the raffle will be 
determined. In Stage 2 of the experiment, ticket purchases will be determined. 
Stage 1 participants will indicate the weight they choose for their team's ticket purchases on their decision sheet. 
Each 1 unit increase in the weight will cost 250. Because each participant begins with $6.00 and each unit costs 250, Stage 
1 participants can choose a weight of 0-24. 
After all Stage 1 participants make their decisions, the experimenter will collect the decision sheets. The decision 
sheets will be randomly and anonymously paired. The experimenter will record the weights chosen on the decision sheets 
of two randomly selected Stage 2 players, under the headings "weight for your ticket purchases chosen by the STAGE 1 
participant on your team" and "weight for your opponent's tickets purchases chosen by the STAGE 1 participant on your 
opponent's team." 
Next the experimenter will distribute the Stage 2 decision sheets. After viewing the weights, the Stage 2 participants 
will decide how many tickets to purchase, each of which costs the Stage 2 participant 250. Because each participant 
begins with $6.00 and each ticket costs 250, Stage 2 participants can purchase 0-24 tickets. After all Stage 2 participants 
have indicated the number of tickets they wish to purchase, the experimenter will collect the Stage 2 decision sheets. The 
Stage 1 decision sheets will then be updated to reflect the number of tickets purchased by team members and opponents. 
Once the weights and ticket purchases have been determined, the experimenter will conduct the raffle. A computer 
generated random drawing will determine which team wins the raffle. 
Expected Earnings 
Because you are a STAGE 1 participant, your decisions will determine the weight for your team's ticket purchases. 
Your expected earnings (in dollars) are equal to the $6.00 endowment minus the amount you spend on the weight plus the 
probability your team wins the prize times $4.00 (the amount of the prize). 
Expected Earnings = $6.00? (amount you spend on the weight) + (probability your team wins the prize x $4.00) 
Included with these instructions is a table that lists the "expected prize" for your group associated with different 
combinations of weighted group ticket purchases. Note that this table does not list your expected earnings because it 
does not include the $6 endowment or the amount you spend on the weight. 
It is important to remember that the expected prize is based on the probability your team wins the prize. Your 
actual earnings are dependent on whether you win the prize or not. You can think of the expected prize as an average 
prize amount awarded if we repeated the raffle many times using the same probability that your team wins the prize each 
time. 
The table is provided to help you make your decision. Feel free to take time to study the sheet before you make 
a decision. 
Actual Earnings 
Your earnings will be the part of your $6.00 endowment that is not spent on weight, plus the $4.00 prize if your 
team wins. 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE WEIGHT YOU CHOOSE FOR YOUR TEAMMATE'S TICKET PURCHASES 
BY FILLING IN THE DESIRED AMOUNT ON YOUR DECISION SHEET. 
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